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Abstract 
Decision science is an area of enquiry that crosses many disciplines, from psychology to 
economics, each with their own perspective of decision making. Traditionally, 
mathematicians have envisaged decision making as a purely rational endeavour, 
whereas psychologists and behavioural economists have critiqued this narrative, and 
suggested that cognitive short cuts are the real mechanisms behind how decisions are 
made. However, contemporary dual process theorists argue that two systems of the 
mind exist: system one (intuitive decision making); and, system two (rational decision 
making). The current review will present a relatively new metaphor for decision 
making: the unified threshold model. This model is a global approach to decision 
making which allows both intuitive and rational decision making processes to be 
explained in a more flexible manner than the dual process model. This review will 
introduce the reader to different types of threshold models (Counter and Diffusion), 
their assumptions, and their ability to explain decision making behaviour. Implications 
and future research will also be discussed. In summary, the aim of this review is to 
highlight that the unified threshold model of decision making may be a more adequate 
explanation of decision making data in comparison to previous models and theories. 
 
Keywords 
Decision science, normative decision making, Bayesian theorem, heuristics and biases, 
unified threshold model, Diffusion Threshold Model.  
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Decision science: a new hope  
A decision is a choice that an individual has to make between at least two alternatives; 
the decision maker may be motivated to obtain, or elude, a certain outcome (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2012; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Schall, 2005). Further, when faced with a choice, 
an individual will carry out a task and should be able to give some explanation for their 
decision (Schall, 2005). Although it may be clear to the layperson what a decision is, the 
ways in which individuals use different decision making strategies to reach certain 
outcomes, and how complex these strategies can be, is less clear. The current review will 
discuss decision making from a number of different perspectives including but not limited 
to: the normative approach, heuristics and biases and the dual process theory of decision 
making. By reviewing each of these approaches of decision making, it will become clear 
that these approaches are only able to explain decision making processes to a satisficing 
level. The current review aims to introduce readers to a relatively new type of model of 
decision making (i.e., unified threshold models) that aspires to be the new hope of 
decision science, and thus explain decision making behaviour more optimally. This 
unified threshold model of decision making shares with the dual process model its ability 
to explain both rational and non-rational judgments. However, the unified threshold 
approach to decision making is more flexible than the dual process model in that it 
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perceives rationality and intuition to be poles at either end of a spectrum, with each mode 
of decision making only differing in regard to cue usage (Lee & Cummins, 2004). In 
addition, this review hopes to introduce the reader to different types of threshold model 
(i.e., the Diffusion Threshold model and Counter Threshold model), their respective 
assumptions and their abilities to explain decision making behaviour. Both practical and 
theoretical implications relating to the Diffusion Threshold Model (i.e., the model that 
best explains decision making behaviour) are also discussed. Furthermore, the authors 
hope to show that unified threshold models of decision making (Specifically Diffusion 
Threshold Models) may be decision science new hope.  
The Bayesian Menace: an introduction to rational decision making.  
Initially, philosophers, psychologists, mathematicians and economists viewed individuals 
as being highly rational and they treated the human mind as a “Laplacean Demon” 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, p.650). This means that limitations of the mind, such as 
limited capacity, cognitive overload and time restraints, were not taken into account 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Humans were thought to have extraordinary decision 
making abilities, and used logic, rationality and probabilities to work out what was the 
most appropriate alternative to take in relation to a choice (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Therefore, rational decision making can be defined as 
decision making processes that integrate all of the information available and that lead to 
outcomes with the most utility.  
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Many models use this rational method of decision making to establish how individuals 
come to reach decisions. One such model is the Bayesian model (Cummins, 2012; 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Kahan, 2015; Simon, 2004). This model is probabilistic, in that it 
works on the basis that the prior probability and conditional probability (which is based 
on evidence) allow a prediction or a decision to be made (Cummins, 2012; Gigerenzer, 
2002; Kahan, 2015; Simon, 2004). This model also assumes that each piece of 
information is evaluated (i.e., given a probability) independently in a sequential and linear 
fashion until a judgment is finally reached using all of the available information 
(Cummins, 2012; Kahan, 2015; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Simon, 2004). The Bayesian 
model of decision making is a normative approach to decision making, and has been seen 
by some as the benchmark to use when investigating human decision processes 
(Cummins, 2012; Gigerenzer, 2002).  
There are many criticisms of rational approaches to decision making, such as Bayesian 
models, however.  One potential criticism of the Bayesian model is its complexity 
(Thagard, 2004), as the model analyses all the information available in particular 
scenarios, and this makes it unlikely that people will use this type of decision making 
strategy when analysing information. This is simply because of the cognitive costs and 
time limitations associated with such an in-depth analysis of the available information 
(Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). Consequently, Bayesian theorem may not mirror decision 
making processes that occur in real life (Pennington & Hastie, 1981). In addition, 
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analysing all of the information available may make it unlikely that important information 
will be used when making a decision (see Gigerenzer & Goldsetin, 1996). If all of the 
information is processed, the significance of certain pieces of information may be lost; 
thus, the quality of information may be more important than the quantity used.  
The rational choice theory is another normative theory of decision making. This theory 
of decision making assumes that decision makers are motivated by utility (Friedman, 
1953). This theory was born out of philosophy and economics but has been extended to 
politics and criminology (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Many theories fall under the banner 
of rational choice. One such theory is the subjective utility theory (Savage, 1954), this 
theory, like all rational choice theories, assumes that decision makers choose the outcome 
with the highest expected utility. For example, if choosing which car to buy with two 
possible options (e.g., car A vs. car B), the theory suggests that you will evaluate each 
factor (fuel consumption, price of car, millage) associated with the decision in relation to 
costs and benefits, this will then allow you to generate a total expected utility for each of 
the potential options, which will then form the basis for your decision (Becker, 2003). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) found, however, that decision makers do not always pick 
the option with the most utility, and will chose an option with lower net gain rather than 
risk a greater gain (i.e., they are risk averse); this deviates from what many rational choice 
models would predict.  They also found that decision makers deviate from the invariance 
principle, which is a key principle of many rational choice models, as the description (or 
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frame) of their decision tasks had an impact on the choice that was ultimately chosen. 
Tversky and Kahneman’s experiments on framing highlighted that normative models of 
decision making cannot fully explain decision making behaviour, and out of the ashes of 
rational choice theory prospect theory was born (i.e., decision makers do not always 
choose the outcome with the most utility; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) .  
A recent literature meta-analysis by Steiger and Kuhberger (2018) suggested that 
framing effects are real, and that experimentation on such effects has been reliable. The 
effects of framing have been found to have an impact on a number of different applied 
environments, from psychiatric risk assessments (Jefferies-Sewell, Sharma, Gale, 
Hawley, Georgiou, & Laws, 2015) to politics (Druckman, 2001). Furthermore, the 
framing effect shows that rational decision making models cannot always explain the 
decision processes of decision makers.  
Framing effects can be attenuated, however, and are dependent on a number of factors 
(Druckman, 2001). Druckman (2001) showed that heterogeneous discussions in non-
experts (different participants receiving different frames of same decision) and 
homogeneous discussions in experts (different participants receiving same frames of 
same decision) attenuate framing effects. McElroy and Seta (2004) showed that framing 
effects only occurred when the right hemisphere of the brain was activated, whereas 
framing effects were not present when the left hemisphere was activated. Further, Thomas 
and Miller (2012) showed that prompts to think “like a scientist” promoted analytical 
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decision making and reduced the framing effect (p. 143). These results highlight that the 
framing effect can be attenuated and that rational processing is possible, thus suggesting 
that neither rational choice models nor prospect theory explains decision making 
behaviour fully; this idea of decision makers being able to be both rational and non-
rational will be discussed again in the section named: “The return of the rational mind”.  
In summary, rational approaches of decision making can be seen to be unrealistic 
approaches to decision making that only explain part of the process. Individuals do not 
always make rational decisions, and Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) seminal work on 
framing effects highlights this. Ironically, framing effects have also been shown to be 
ineffective at consistently explaining decision processes. Therefore, we will now turn to 
Tversky and Kahneman’s work on heuristics and biases, and will evaluate how effective 
said approach is when explaining decision making processes.  
Attack of the heuristics: an introduction and evaluation to the heuristics and biases 
programme.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981) took a different approach to decision making; they 
accepted that normative models were ideal, but they believed that decision makers did 
not always follow normative models of decision making. Tversky and Kahneman 
revolutionised the field of decision science by suggesting that their new heuristics 
(cognitive short cuts) allowed decision makers to reach outcomes efficiently. A heuristic 
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is a rule of thumb technique that allows individuals to make decisions without using heavy 
cognitive computation, thus easing cognitive load (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). There are three ‘classic’ heuristics that were 
originally proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981): 1) representativeness; 2) 
availability; 3) and, anchoring and adjustment. These heuristics and their associated 
biases will now be briefly discussed.  
The representativeness heuristic relates to people ignoring base rate information, and 
instead incorporating context and preconceived information when forming their 
judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). One reason for the representativeness 
heuristic being used by decision makers may relate to cognitive load (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, 1981), as it is much easier (in terms of cognition) for individuals to 
base their judgments on stereotypes in comparison to base line statistics (Gigerenzer, 
2002). However, the representativeness heuristic’s ignorance of base line statistics can 
lead to many different types of cognitive biases and fallacies (decisions based on flawed 
logic according to normative models), such as the base rate fallacy (ignorance of the prior 
probability). The representative heuristic has been one of the most widely studied 
heuristics because of its association with stereotyping, racism and prejudice. For instance, 
Chan and Wang (2014) found that stereotyping has an impact on hiring outcomes, with 
females being more likely to be hired in female dominated careers, and males being more 
likely to be hired in male dominated careers.  
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The availability heuristic is another heuristic investigated by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974). It works on the premise that individuals make decisions founded on how easy 
information comes to mind, allowing decisions to be made quickly and with relative ease 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). However, this heuristic can cause people to over-
estimate the probability of an easily imagined event occurring (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974, 1981), which could bias people’s judgments in a number of situations, including in 
relation to financial decisions. The availability heuristic can also cause decision makers 
to make errors in relation to both predicting the likelihood of an event occurring and when 
calculating the frequency of a reference group, and has been shown to bias the information 
that decision makers utilise (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For instance, Barber and 
Odean (2008) highlighted that when individuals are deciding on which stock to buy, they 
usually only think about the stock that they have recently been intrigued by.  
A final classic heuristic, originally proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981), is 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This heuristic suggests that people’s judgments 
are sensitive to anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). Anchors are normally the 
first pieces of information given to decision makers, and they have a disproportionate 
effect on the decision making process and outcome. Tversky and Kahnman (1974, 1981) 
demonstrated that participants were sensitive to previously presented numbers, which 
caused an anchoring effect that was then adjusted for when making the final decision. 
However, these adjustments were often ‘under-adjusted’ and remained close to the 
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original value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). Despite this heuristic first being 
studied over forty years ago, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic continues to be 
studied in disciplines relating to finance and civil law (Feldman, Schurr, & Teichman, 
2016; Siddiqi, 2016). For instance, Siddiqi (2016) suggested that the “volatility of the 
underlying stock returns” are used as an initial anchor by decision makers on the stock 
market, these decision makers then adjust upwards, although insufficiently, to reach a call 
option volatility (p.32).  
Many of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974, 1981) heuristics are beneficial on more 
occasions than they are incorrect, however.  Researchers such as Lieder, Griffiths, Huys, 
and Goodman (2017) have shown that the anchoring and adjustment heuristic does not 
symbolise an irrational method of decision making, and rather proposes that the 
adjustment from initial anchors is a rational behaviour, with the amount of adjustment 
being dependent on the importance of the decision. Further, Lieder et al. (2007) suggest 
that decision makers calculate time and error costs when estimating how much adjustment 
from the anchor is necessary. It has also been shown that decision making based upon 
heuristics can lead to accurate outcomes being reached (Klein, 2001). For example, 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) have found that fast and frugal heuristics, such as the 
Take The Best (TTB) heuristic (i.e., where a decision is made based upon the first cue 
that allowed two outcomes to be discriminated), are more efficient at making predictions 
than mathematical methods, such as multiple regressions. This, therefore, proposes that 
12 
 
heuristics may direct decision makers to accurate inferences, and that prejudices may be 
an integral part of the decision making process (Gigerenzer, & Brighton, 2009; 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Snook & Cullen, 2008). Furthermore, the research on 
heuristics and biases highlights that sometimes heuristics are beneficial, and that other 
times heuristics lead to errors. This suggests that animals who evolved only a rational 
manner of decision making (absent of bias) would be disadvantaged in some contexts, 
and that animals who only reasoned intuitively would be disadvantaged in others. 
Therefore, it is suggested that Homo sapiens would have greatly benefited from having 
two separate methods of making decisions: 1) intuitive and 2) analytical (Kahneman, 
2011). This is because an intuitive method of decision making saves cognitive load when 
decisions are routine and effortless (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008), whereas an analytical 
system generates logic and reasoning when a decision is effortful and irregular, thus 
suggesting a model of decision making that encompasses both rationality and non-
rationality may be more realistic.  
Contemporary research has also highlighted that heuristics can be attenuated and that 
analytical decision processes can be promoted. For instance, research has shown that 
experience and expertise attenuates biased decision processes (Chan & Wang, 2014), and 
that motivation can attenuate the decision maker from using heuristics (Zhang, Zhao, 
Cheung, & Lee, 2014). Therefore, an individual may make some decisions rationally (if 
motivated), and may use heuristics (if not motivated) for other decisions. Neither the 
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normative approach nor the heuristics and biases approach of decision making gives a 
full explanation of how individuals make decisions, for that a unified model of decision 
making is needed.  
 
The return of the rational mind: A dual process theory of decision making.  
Modern decision science has almost come full circle, as rationality and intuition have now 
been incorporated together into Kahneman’s (2011) dual process theory. In this theory, 
Kahneman suggests that individuals possess two separate parts of the mind that govern 
how a decision is made: system one and system two (sometimes referred to as type one 
and type two; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  System one is an evolutionary old part of the 
mind that is utilised by a number of animals (including humans), it is intuitive and utilises 
heuristics to make efficient decisions (Evans, 2003). Although, system one is not merely 
one system, it is a multifactorial system that is made up of a plethora of cognitive short 
cuts that allow decision makers to make intuitive responses (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
System two on the other hand is more rational, conscious and effortful, and it evolved 
relatively recently in human history; around 50,000 bc (Evans, 2003). There is support 
for the Dual Process theory as DeNeys (2006) found that correct decisions on a 
conjunction fallacy task take longer than incorrect decisions, which fits with Kahneman’s 
(2011) description of system two as said system is thought to be more deliberative and 
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effortful than its intuitive counterpart. Research from neuroscience does suggest that 
specific brain areas are associated with rational (orbital and medial pre-frontal cortex) 
and biased (amygdala) decision making (De Martino, 2006), providing further evidence 
for the existence of these two systems.  
Further, Phillips, Fletcher, Marks and Hine (2016) found in a meta-analysis that intuitive 
decision strategies shared a positive relationship with experience, but had a negative 
association with the normative correct response (i.e., performance). They also discovered 
that rational decision making (or reflective thinking styles) was positively associated with 
performance and experience. In addition, Phillips et al. (2016) showed that time pressures 
decreased the relationship between rational decision making and performance, the same 
was not true for the relationship between intuitive decision making and performance. The 
strongest relationship between rational decision making and performance was found to 
be between either the ages of 12 to 18 or for individuals that were 25 and plus, which 
highlighted that age is an important mediator between the mode of decision making and 
performance. Furthermore, Phillips et al.’s (2016) meta-analysis showed that a model that 
incorporates both rational and intuitive processes of decision making is necessary to 
account for individual differences and for the effects that context has on decision making 
performance.  
Despite the appeal of the dual process theory of decision making, it has been criticised 
for being too simplistic as some decisions cannot be categorised within either of the two 
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systems, and may fall in a middle zone of quasi-rationality (Cader, Campbell, & Watson, 
2005; Dhami & Thomson, 2012; Hammond, 1996). Keren and Schul (2009) go as far to 
propose that there is a lack of scientific evidence supporting two systems of the mind, as 
decision making attributes (e.g., conscious vs. unconscious; emotional vs. analytical) do 
not cluster together to form a dual process model. Evans and Stanovich (2013), however, 
counter the continuum vs. discrete type debate by suggesting that individual differences 
exist with the type two system (rational system), and that a continuum exists within this 
system. Nevertheless, is a dual process theory of decision making needed if a unified 
decision making theory can account for the data? Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) argue 
no, they propose that a unified model of decision making is satisficing enough to explain 
decision making data.  
 One example of a unified theory of decision making is the Cognitive Continuum Theory, 
and this theory suggests that rationality is on a continuum, with intuitive and rational 
decision making at either ends of this continuum and quasi-rational decision processes 
being somewhere in the middle (Cader et al., 2005; Dhami & Thomson, 2012; Hammond, 
1996). This theory is a lot more malleable than the dual process theory of decision 
making, as it explains rational and intuitive behaviour in a more flexible manner. 
Nevertheless, the Cognitive Continuum Theory fails to account for the metacognitive 
processes behind why some individuals display rational behaviour and why others make 
intuitive decisions. Further, the Cognitive Continuum Theory lacks utility into how 
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individuals actually make everyday decisions, as it cannot explain the process behind how 
a decision is reached. 
Unified threshold models of decision making, however, may be able to explain the mode 
of cognition a decision maker utilises when choosing an outcome. A number of pieces of 
research have proposed that thresholds that vary in regard to cue usage can explain both 
rational and intuitive judgements (Curley, Murray, MacLean, & Laybourn, 2017; Curley, 
MacLean, Murray, Pollock, & Laybourn, in press; Curley, Murray, MacLean, Laybourn, 
& Brown, in press; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). In other words, 
thresholds that are reached using a satisficing amount of information mirror intuitive 
judgements, and thresholds that are reached using an optimal amount of information 
mirror rational decision processes. This, therefore, suggests that unified threshold models 
may be a better metaphor to use when describing decision making behaviour, as said 
models can explain both intuitive and rational decision processes, whilst also explaining 
the metacognitive processes behind the cognitive mode of the decision maker.  
 
Decision Science: A new hope.  
The remainder of the current review will discuss how a unified threshold model of 
decision making can explain both rational and intuitive decision processes. A unified 
threshold model aims to encompass all of the heuristics within the fast and frugal research 
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paradigm. That is, instead of a number of heuristics being used to make decisions in 
different environments, one decision making strategy that fits all environments, through 
varying cue utilisation, is argued to exist (Lee & Cummins, 2004).  In the threshold model, 
it is argued that decisions are made when a specific threshold is met (Ratcliff & Smith, 
2004) and that said threshold might shift to suit different environments (Lee & Cummins, 
2004). If intuitive decision making is needed, the threshold is low, meaning fewer cues 
are used, whereas if rational decision making is needed, cue utilisation will increase as 
the threshold increases.   
One of the main reasons for the emergence of a threshold model of decision making was 
because participants have been shown to use both non-compensatory and compensatory 
processes when making decisions in experiments (Lee & Cummins, 2004); hence, 
existing models were not able to describe decision processes fully.  Previous research has 
shown that different decision making strategies, including the TTB approach, are used in 
some scenarios and not in others (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; Brown & Tan, 2011; 
Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013; Sojka & Giese, 2001). For instance, verbal 
information and memory-based tasks are likely to cause participants to use strategies 
associated with the TTB approach, and rational processes of decision making are more 
associated with visual, image based tasks and tasks that do not rely on memory (Bröder 
& Schiffer, 2003; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003). 
Therefore, a unified threshold model may give a more comprehensive account of decision 
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making across different scenarios in comparison to other theories/models of decision 
making (Newell & Lee, 2010). 
Threshold models may give a more global explanation of decision making than heuristic 
models can, as threshold models can explain everything from the TTB model to rational 
decision making, without adding additional conceptions of complicated strategies (Lee & 
Cummins, 2004; Lee et al., 2014). They can also explain Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
heuristics through having a satisficing and biased threshold, biased in that the threshold 
may favour a particular outcome. Furthermore, the threshold model encompasses more 
data, thus making said model more complete in regard to the scientific goal of generating 
global theories, which are of commonplace in the natural sciences.  
The unified model of decision making has also been described as an “adjustable spanner” 
(Newell, 2005, p.7). Essentially, rather than changing strategies (or heuristics) to suit 
different environments, decision makers simply tailor their thresholds, and make 
decisions once a threshold has been reached (Newell, Collins, & Lee, 2007; Newell & 
Lee, 2010). That is, decision makers adjust their tolerance for how much evidence is 
acceptable to make a decision, and these tolerance levels/thresholds can change 
depending on the situation (Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell & Lee, 2010; Söllner, Bröder, 
Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014). Consequently, in some environments (e.g., what university 
to go to) people may use all of the information supplied, whereas in less important 
decisions (e.g., what to wear to go to the pub) individuals may only have a low threshold, 
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allowing the decision to be made using less cues (Newell & Bröder, 2008; Söllner et al., 
2014).   
The Evidence Accumulation Model (i.e., a type of threshold model; Lee & Cummins, 
2004) uses elements of the TTB algorithm and the rational decision making approach 
(Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007); these elements essentially relate to threshold level (Newell 
& Bröder, 2008). For instance, if the threshold for a certain decision is small, then 
individuals may be frugal in their use of cues and thus mirror the TTB heuristic (Lee et 
al., 2014; Newell & Bröder, 2008). However, if individuals are using many cues, or all of 
the cues to make a decision, and demonstrating rational behaviour then it might be 
because their threshold for this particular decision is relatively high (Lee et al., 2014; 
Newell & Bröder, 2008). 
Lee and Cummins (2004) tested the Evidence Accumulation Model by comparing the 
usage of two different models of decision making with said model. One of the models 
that was used was the rational model (i.e., RAT; Lee & Cummins, 2004). In this model, 
individuals use all the information and will chose the outcome with the most support. The 
other model used in this research was the TTB approach, which was discussed earlier. 
The only difference between these two models relates to accumulation of evidence 
(Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell & Lee, 2009). When the 
TTB approach was used, individuals accumulated less evidence, and thus had a lower 
threshold (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Lee & Cummins, 2004). In contrast, when the RAT 
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strategy was chosen, individuals accumulated more, or all, of the information/cues, which 
means that they had a higher threshold (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Lee & Cummins, 
2004). 
Lee and Cummins’ (2004) comparison of the RAT and TTB models found that over 
52.5% of the participants that neither of the two strategies were used exclusively. 
Nevertheless, a unified threshold model of decision making that fused the RAT and TTB 
model could account for more of the observed data than either of the other two models 
could do on their own: unified threshold model = 85.5%; RAT model = 64%; and, TTB 
model = 36% (Lee & Cummins, 2004). Further, Dieckmann & Rieskampm (2007) 
showed that in environments where there was a lot of useless information provided, the 
TTB option was optimal to a naïve Bayes strategy, whereas in other contexts, where not 
a lot of redundant information was provided, the naïve Bayes strategy was optimal. This 
once again highlights that a threshold that varies in regard to information usage allows a 
decision maker to be more adaptable to new decision making contexts. In summary, the 
unified threshold approach to decision making may be a new alternative that may help to 
explain decision making behaviour more fully than previous approaches to decision 
making. Nevertheless, a plethora of different threshold models exist, the next section of 
this review will evaluate based on previous research which threshold model of decision 
making has the greatest utility to decision science. 
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Threshold models awaken: a comparison and evaluation of different Threshold 
models of decision making. 
Various unified threshold models exist, and each of these models can be split across two 
categories of unified threshold model: Counter Threshold Models and Diffusion 
Threshold Models (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). One similarity across the two separate types 
of threshold model is that both of them have thresholds that can vary in regard to cue 
usage, with frugal cue usage mirroring intuitive processes and compensatory cue usage 
mirroring rational processes. However, there are a number of ways in that these two 
separate categories of threshold model differ from one another. These differences will be 
explored further in the remainder of the current section through discussing the respective 
assumptions of both Counter Threshold Models and Diffusion Threshold Models. 
Counter Threshold Models suggest that when a decision is being made, each outcome of 
the choice is represented by a counter, and evidence is evaluated in a binary manner in 
respect to what outcome it favours (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). When evidence favours a 
particular outcome, it is placed in the outcomes respective counter, and this occurs until 
the evidence allows an outcome to be favoured (i.e., when evidence that supports a 
particular outcome allows a threshold to be reached). Therefore, Counter threshold 
models assume that decision makers collect information in separate counters that 
represent the outcomes of a choice, and that once enough information has been collected 
for an outcome to be favoured, then that outcome is chosen. Counter Threshold Models 
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have absolute stopping rules, and once a threshold is reached, information search 
terminates (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). 
This absolute stopping rule approach to decision making can be broken down further into 
two different types of Counter Threshold Model. First, there is the Accumulator Model 
where evidence intake varies but occurs at fixed intervals (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). 
Second, there is the Poisson Counter Model (Lemieux, 2007) where evidence 
accumulation is fixed, but the accrual of information happens at variable times across a 
continuous time scale (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). These two models are the most relevant 
within the current review as they are the main successors of early Counter Threshold 
Models, they are well cited within the literature and they vary enough to give a full view 
of what can be encompassed within a Counter Threshold Model of decision making 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). 
In the Accumulator Model, evidence is collected across two separate counters (Ratcliff & 
Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Varying evidence amounts are collected in a 
sequential fashion, using a sensory referent mechanism, at discrete time periods (Ratcliff 
& Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Van Maanen & Van Rijn, 2007). The sensory 
referent mechanism allows information to be placed into the appropriate counters (one or 
two), each of which representing a different outcome, and weighted. If information 
surpasses the sensory referent, which is equivalent to zero, the residual difference 
between the information collected and the sensory referent is placed into counter one 
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(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). However, if the information falls short of the sensory referent, 
the residual difference between the information collected and the sensory referent is 
placed into counter two. The information is collected in separate counters until one 
threshold is reached (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004); this then allows a 
decision to be made. Models that are related to the Accumulator Model (e.g., the self-
regulating accumulator) have also been used to map how confidence can change and adapt 
thresholds (Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Lee & Dry, 2006; Lee, Newell, & Vandekerckhove, 
2014), highlighting how effective unified threshold models are at explaining decision 
data.  
Conversely, the Poisson Counter Model proposes that information is independently 
accrued in exact pieces (i.e., a cue or a value) at a constant rate (continuously distributed 
times), and is gathered on separate counters representing different outcomes (Lemieux, 
2007; Merkle & Van Zandt, 2006). The evidence continues to accrue until a threshold is 
reached (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004), which then allows a decision to be made. Further, the 
quality of the information can increase the accumulation of one count over another 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). This links to naturalistic decision making, as the environment 
also has an effect on the decision making process (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
In contrast to Counter Threshold Models, Diffusion Threshold Models suggest that when 
making a decision, individuals integrate information until they reach a point (or threshold) 
where one outcome is favoured relative to the opposing outcome. In Diffusion Threshold 
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Models, information that pushes the decision maker away from one threshold attracts the 
decision maker to the opposing threshold (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). This is because 
thresholds exist on the same continuum, rather than on separate counters, in Diffusion 
Threshold Models. Two separate Diffusion Threshold Models exist: the Wiener Diffusion 
Model; and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Diffusion model (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). 
 The Wiener Diffusion Model, which was named after the mathematician Norbert Wiener 
who discussed stochastic processes (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Smith and Ratcliff (2004) 
were the first researchers to describe the model within a psychological context. In this 
model, information is collected from a starting point (Ș), and is gathered until one of two 
thresholds are reached (e.g., Threshold A and Threshold B; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith 
& Ratcliff, 2004). Once a threshold is reached, a decision is made (Smith & Ratcliff, 
2004). The rate of the accumulation of information from the starting point, Ș, to either of 
the thresholds, A or B, is called the drift rate (Θ) (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).  
The drift rate is the mean information accrual from a stimulus over specific time units 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Drift rates are relatively flexible as they can change depending 
on the complexity of the decision making task (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). For example, 
drift rates are larger for simple decisions and are smaller for decisions that are more 
complex. This has implications for real world decisions, as decisions with small drift rates 
involving low information quality will have longer response times, and may be more 
likely to be incorrect (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Drift rates can be 
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positive or negative depending on whether the information that has been accumulated is 
causing individuals drift to move towards a negative threshold or a positive threshold 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).  
An additional important theoretical contribution of the Wiener Diffusion Model is that 
the starting point of the model can change (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Individuals may not 
start off symmetrically, in-between the two thresholds, but may instead be biased towards 
a certain threshold (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). This model may, consequently, explain 
decision biases (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004) that were originally 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981), as discussed earlier. 
A skewed starting point (closer to one threshold relative to another) has also been 
associated with quicker decisions that are less accurate (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004), once 
again mirroring heuristic processing. If a starting/prior point is close to a threshold, then 
less information is needed to reach said threshold, which increases the likelihood of an 
error and makes the decision more likely to be quick (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004), thus 
skewed starting points may facilitate fast and frugal decision making. The Wiener 
Diffusion Model can also explain commonly observed psychological phenomena, such 
as the speed/accuracy trade-off (Franks, Dornhaus, Fitzsimmons, & Stevens, 2003; Smith 
& Ratcliff, 2004). In addition, through allowing drift rate and starting points to vary, the 
model can explain why errors happen quickly in accuracy focused tasks and why errors 
happen more slowly in speed focussed tasks (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Furthermore, the 
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Diffusion Threshold Model may help to explain why previous research has found 
conflicting evidence in relation to heuristic accuracy rates.   
Previous research has suggested that incorrect decisions occur when decision makers 
deviate from the classical rational approach (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). 
Nevertheless, the Wiener Diffusion Model proposes that errors and correct responses 
come from fluctuations and variability in starting points, drift rates, threshold levels and 
noise (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). In summary, the Wiener 
Diffusion Model incorporates mathematical principles from a normative approach, and 
has inbuilt biases attached within it, thus allowing it to be a descriptive mathematic model 
that is able to describe decision making data to an optimal standard. The second Diffusion 
model that will be mentioned here is the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model (as described by 
Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). This model is essentially an extension of the Wiener Diffusion 
Model of decision making, and the only difference is that this model proposes that the 
more evidence that is collected, the more decay will happen; and decay is defined as a 
mathematical function that decreases the drift (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Psychologically, 
decay is equivalent to forgetting previous information as novel information is being 
processed.  
Ratcliff and Smith (2004) conducted three separate psychophysics experiments and then 
tested the abilities of the four models mentioned above (The Accumulator Model; The 
Poisson Counter Model; The Wiener Diffusion Model; and, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
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model) in relation to how well they explained their decision making data. The first study 
was a signal detection experiment, where participants were asked to make a judgment on 
whether the distance between dots was small or large. In experiment two, participants 
were asked to make a decision on whether a letter string was a word or a non-word. For 
the first two experiments, participants were told to either value accuracy or speed, and 
this value varied between the blocks of trials. In the final experiment, participants were 
asked to state whether they recognised or did not recognise a target word in relation to a 
previously shown list of words. As previously stated, each of the models were then fitted 
against the data (i.e., response times for correct and incorrect responses, accuracy rates 
and data distributions) from all three experiments. It was found that in the decision tasks 
that the Accumulator Model outperformed the Poisson Counter Model in relation to 
describing the decision making data. In addition, the decay function of the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck model was found to have an influence on how well the model fitted decision 
making data (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). When the model had a moderate or large decay, it 
was found not to fit decision making data as well as the original Wiener Diffusion Model 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model fitted Ratcliff and Smith’s 
(2004) experimental data best when the decay parameter was zero (i.e., when it mirrored 
the Wiener Diffusion Model). Over the thee experiments, Ratcliff and Smith (2004) found 
that the Wiener Diffusion Model fitted the decision making data the best when compared 
to the other three models. In addition, a recent paper by Curley et al. (in press) found that 
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decision making data was best explained by Diffusion Threshold Models in comparison 
to Counter Threshold models. Therefore, future research should utilise the Diffusion 
Threshold Model when investigating decision making behaviour, and should also test the 
efficacy of said model in applied environments. The next section will further explore 
potential avenues of future research and will discuss the implications that unified 
threshold models have for both theory and practice.  
 
Implications and future research 
Unified threshold models of decision making have the impact to lead to a paradigm shift 
in decision science, as the theoretical implications of said models are great. The first 
implication of unified threshold model is that it allows the importance of a decision to be 
captured (Lee & Cummins, 2004). Currently, decisions are viewed in a binary sense, they 
are either important and decision makers use rational processes to tackle them or they are 
trivial and decision makers use heuristics to make the decision. Not every decision is like 
this though; there is a gradient of importance related to decisions, and rationality can be 
viewed on a spectrum. Your decision of what to wear today is less important than your 
decision of what car to buy, which is once again less important than what job you decide 
to apply for (Lee & Cummins, 2004); and, different levels of rationality would be required 
to make each of the above decisions. The unified threshold metaphor of decision making 
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is more dynamic than previous models of decision making (i.e., the dual process theory), 
however. Decisions can be viewed from every level of importance, with different levels 
of rationality associated with differing levels of task importance. Differences in the 
rationality and importance of the decision can then be reflected in unified threshold 
models by measuring how much information is needed to reach a decision threshold. In 
addition to this, and in relation to bounded rationality, the unified threshold model 
highlights to researchers and practitioners how much available information was provided 
by the environment and how strong said information was perceived to be (Lee & 
Cummins, 2004).  When a lot of strong information is provided, decisions may be made 
quickly; whereas, slow decisions may mirror when the information presented was limited 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).  
In a practical sense, unified threshed models allow biases to be measured in a way that 
does not compare humans to normative models of decision making and rather compares 
biases to other people. Biases are seen to be deviations from the norm (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), and by measuring how much information decision makers use to reach 
a threshold, decision scientists can measure how much individuals differ from one another 
in relation to compensatory decision making, thus highlighting when biases emerge 
(Curley et al., in press). For instance, Curley et al. (in press), in a juror decision making 
experiment, measured how many cues it took for individuals to reach their threshold, 
participants were then categorised across the verdicts they gave (Guilty, Not Guilty, and 
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the Scottish specific acquittal verdict of Not Proven). They found that jurors who gave a 
Guilty verdict used significantly less information than jurors who gave either of the 
acquittal verdicts, thus highlighting that jurors who gave a Guilty verdict had a satisficing 
Guilty threshold, and were more biased to said threshold in comparison to the other jurors. 
This same methodology could be used to measure biases in other applied setting such as 
medicine. For example, do some doctors need less information to recommend surgery 
than others do because of a pre-consultation bias, or are some stock brokers biased 
towards a certain stock because of environmental pressures, and do they need less 
information to reach the threshold associated with this stock when compared to other 
stock brokers that make decisions within a different context. The use of the unified 
threshold metaphor is useful to practitioners because if it is known that certain types of 
people or certain circumstances cause thresholds to be reached frugally, and a frugal 
threshold is not optimal in that circumstance, then attempts can be made to evaluate the 
types of variables that promote more compensatory threshold. To do this previous 
research can be utilised which aims to attenuate biases (see Thomas & Miller, 2012).  
Unified threshold models of decision making share elements with the Cognitive 
Continuum Theory in that unified threshold models propose that rationality is on a 
continuum which begins with intuitive processes. However, unified threshold models 
hold more utility in that they can be used to explain how decisions are actually made. 
Previously, decision science has had two separate types of literature on decision making. 
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The first type related to overarching theories, like the dual process theory and the 
Cognitive Continuum Theory, that highlight that decision making is made up of both 
rational and intuitive processes, but cannot really explain the process of how specific 
decisions are made. For example, the dual process theory highlights that a doctor who is 
deciding on the best course of action may under time pressures may use system one, and 
may use system two when they have more time to reflect. Nevertheless, the dual process 
theory does not explain the mechanics behind how the doctor chose which avenue to take. 
The second type relates to models that explain how decisions are reached, these are 
normally heuristic models, such as TTB model, that shows the process behind how a 
decision is reached. These models, however, are very specific and do not explain the 
majority of decision making behaviour (Lee & Cummins, 2004). Unified threshold 
models, such as the Diffusion Threshold Model, bridge the gap between these two 
separate types of literature on decision making models, however. For instance, unified 
threshold models show that decisions are made when information integration allows a 
threshold to be reached (Rarcliff & Smith, 2004), and thus explain the individual decision 
processes of decision makers; in a similar manner to the TTB heuristic. Second, they also 
explain the mode of cognition through measuring how compensatory the threshold was 
in order for it to be reached (Curley et al., in press), and consequently highlight how 
rational the decision maker was being, in a similar vain to the Cognitive Continuum 
Theory.  
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In addition, unified threshold models combine terms that are normally specific to different 
approaches within the discipline of decision science. For instance, information integration 
is normally associated with normative models of decision making, such as Bayesian 
models, whereas satisficing (using a limited amount of information) is more associated 
with heuristic processing and bounded rationality. However, the Diffusion threshold 
Model combines these terms, as decision makers can integrate a satisficing amount of 
information to reach a threshold (Curley et al., in press; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Ratcliff 
& Smith, 2004). Unified threshold models of decision making break decision science 
from the shackles of different disciplines, thus allowing researchers to have a more 
flexible and dynamic approach to the study of decision making. Nevertheless, only a 
limited amount of research has been conducted on threshold decision making, and more 
research is therefore needed. 
Research traditionally investigating Diffusion Threshold Models (i.e., perceptual decision 
making tasks) has used visual and visuomotor tasks involving ‘dots’ on a screen within 
their experiments and asked participants if these ‘dots’ move to the right or the left 
(Bitzer, Park,  Blankenburg, & Kiebel, 2014). Therefore, future research should 
investigate the Diffusion Threshold Models ability to describe decision processes in 
realistic environments (e.g., legal, medicine and finance). Despite the unified threshold 
models’ strengths over other models, information is lacking in regard to how individuals 
choose a threshold. For example, why do some individuals select a satisficing threshold 
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that mirrors heuristic processing? And, why do other people select a more compensatory 
threshold that mirrors rational processing? Therefore, future research should investigate 
the factors (e.g., individual differences and information available in the environment; 
Salas, Martin, & Flin, 2017) that may influence how a threshold is set. In addition, future 
research should investigate where satisficing thresholds are useful, and where thresholds 
that are more compensatory are needed.  In a similar vein, researchers should enquire if 
more compensatory thresholds can be promoted through: the endorsement of analytical 
thought; increasing the motivation of the decision maker; and, expertise (Chan & Wang, 
2014; Thomas & Miller, 2012; Zhang et al., 2014). Finally, future research may want to 
compare which model/theory of decision making (i.e., the dual process theory vs. the 
Wiener Diffusion Model) most adequately explains decision making data. As far as this 
researcher is aware no such research has been conducted, and a direct comparison of the 
two models is needed.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, unified threshold models (specifically the Wiener Diffusion Model) of 
decision making may be decision sciences new hope at being able to explain decision 
making behaviour more optimally. Old hopes relating to normative decision making 
approaches and the heuristics and biases approach only explain some of decision 
making data. Both of these approaches cannot explain why sometimes it is beneficial to 
be intuitive, whereas on other occasions it may be more advantageous to use rational 
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decision making processes. Kahneman’s (2011) dual process theory did try to explain 
decision making data more adequately by encompassing separate systems of the mind 
for intuitive and rational processes. Although very influential, this theory is simplistic in 
its categorisation. In contrast, the unified threshold model of decision making gives a 
more flexible explanation of how the mind encompasses both rational and intuitive 
systems. Further, a dual process theory is not needed when a unified model can explain 
decision making data to an equal standard. Future research that compares the efficacy of 
the unified threshold approach with the dual process approach is needed, however. Only 
then will we know if unified threshold models (such as the Wiener Diffusion Model) of 
decision making are decision science new hope, as previous literature seems to suggest, 
or if they are merely a good contender.  
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